Brexit: Losing control. EPC Discussion Paper, 24 April 2019 by Darvas, Zsolt
Credit: Ludovic MARIN / AFP
Andrew Duff
Brexit: 
Losing control
DISCUSSION PAPER
EUROPEAN POLITICS AND INSTITUTIONS PROGRAMME
24 APRIL 2019
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Andrew Duff is President of the Spinelli Group and a Visiting Fellow at the European Policy Centre. He was 
a member of the European Parliament 1999-2014. He tweets @AndrewDuffEU.
DISCLAIMER
The support the European Policy Centre receives for its ongoing operations, or specifically for its publications, does not constitute 
endorsement of their contents, which reflect the views of the authors only. Supporters and partners cannot be held responsible 
for any use that may be made of the information contained therein. 
Table of contents
Pursuing ratification 3
Mock elections to the European Parliament 3
How a withdrawing state should behave 3
The folly of ‘flextension’ 4
The European Council loses control 4
Meanwhile at Westminster 5
The Attorney General goes to Brussels 5
Improving the Political Declaration 5
Labour-Tory talks 6
A new prime minister 6
The referendum question 7
The referendum answer 7
Taking back control 8 
Endnotes 9
3PURSUING RATIFICATION
Easter provided only a brief respite from Brexit. The 
crisis now continues, with escalating chaos in Britain 
and a breakdown of unity on the side of the EU. 
At its meeting on 21 March the European Council 
considered a request from the British prime minister 
to extend the Article 50 timetable from 29 March 
until 30 June.1 The heads of government rejected 
her request but agreed instead to an extension 
to 22 May, provided that the House of Commons 
had concluded its ratification of the Withdrawal 
Agreement by 12 April.2 That did not work.  
The crisis now continues, with escalating 
chaos in Britain and a breakdown of unity 
on the side of the EU.
Mrs May returned with a second request for an 
extension until 30 June.3 On 10 April, the European 
Council agreed to adjust the clock again, but not to 
stop it ticking. A flexible extension is now granted 
until 31 October “to allow for the ratification of the 
Withdrawal Agreement”. If ratification by both parties 
takes place earlier, the UK will leave the EU on the 
first day of the following month. 
If the British parliament acts decisively and accepts 
the Withdrawal Agreement in May or June, the 
outgoing European Parliament will be recalled, 
somewhat reluctantly, to ratify the Brexit treaty. 
(A quorum of one-third of MEPs is required.)4 If 
nothing happens in London during this period, any 
ratification will fall to the new European Parliament 
which first assembles in Strasbourg on 2 July. The 
European Council will in any case take stock of the 
situation at its next formal meeting on 20-21 June. 
MOCK ELECTIONS TO THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT
Unless the UK ratifies the Withdrawal Agreement by  
22 May (in which case it leaves the Union on 1 June), 
the UK will hold elections to the European Parliament 
on 23 May.5 Three years after Britain voted to leave 
the EU, this may seem preposterous. But the European 
Council declined to stretch the Article 50 rubric that 
would have allowed the UK to derogate from EU 
electoral law in the pursuit of an orderly withdrawal.6 
The new 2019 Parliament, therefore, will be 
composed of 751 members on the same basis as 
the 2014 Parliament, with an apportionment of 
seats between member states that includes several 
blatant breaches of the principle of degressive 
proportionality.7 If the UK ever leaves the Union, 
the House will be re-composed mid-term of 705 
members, in a somewhat undignified fashion.8
If 73 British MEPs turn up at Strasbourg in July they 
will be a motley crew. Many will have been elected 
hurriedly on the basis of highly ambiguous mandates 
and scant scrutiny by the electorate. The elections 
will be treated as a proxy Brexit referendum.9 The 
squabbling Brexiteering parties will be fighting to 
finish the job of Leave, but without offering any 
serious prospectus for Britain after Brexit. The 
squabbling pro-European parties will campaign to 
stay in a ‘reformed’ European Union, but without 
giving any substance to the notion of reform. 
Although MEPs elected from the UK will be 
effectively on probation, they will nonetheless be 
able to take part in all the important constituent 
votes that mark the beginning of the parliamentary 
term – notably the election of Parliament’s 
president, vice-presidents and committee chairs, 
and the election of the new Commission president 
(and approval of his or her programme), followed by 
the parliamentary auditions of the candidates for 
the Commission (including one hapless Brit).  
If 73 British MEPs turn up at Strasbourg  
in July they will be a motley crew.
 
HOW A WITHDRAWING STATE  
SHOULD BEHAVE
British MEPs will not be touched by the injunction 
of the European Council that the British government 
is expected to behave itself during this period. In a 
significant elaboration of the Article 50 process, the 
heads of government asserted:
“The European Council takes note of the 
commitment by the United Kingdom to act 
in a constructive and responsible manner 
throughout the extension in accordance with  
the duty of sincere cooperation and expects  
the United Kingdom to fulfil this commitment 
and Treaty obligation in a manner that reflects 
its situation as a withdrawing Member State.  
To this effect, the United Kingdom shall 
facilitate the achievement of the Union’s tasks 
and refrain from any measure which could 
jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s 
objectives, in particular when participating in 
the decision-making processes of the Union.”
Theresa May agreed to these rather humiliating 
terms, presumably safe in the knowledge that 
they were aimed not at her personally but at her 
successor as prime minister. No obvious sanctions 
exist at the hands of the European Council if the UK 
disregards these terms of engagement in its capacity 
as the “withdrawing member state”. To take the 
UK to the European Court of Justice for breaching 
the principle of sincere cooperation would, in such 
4circumstances, be bizarre.10 But it is obvious that 
were the British to deliberately pollute the on-going 
business of the EU 27, their chances of achieving a 
quick, decent and long-term association agreement 
with the Union would be much diminished.  
No obvious sanctions exist at the  
hands of the European Council if the  
UK disregards these terms of engagement 
in its capacity as the “withdrawing  
member state”.
 
THE FOLLY OF ‘FLEXTENSION’
Donald Tusk, President of the European Council, 
takes pride in the concept of the flexible extension. 
If it had not been for the objection of Emmanuel 
Macron, indeed, the extension offered would have 
been twelve rather than six months. But what use 
will really be made of this flexibility? At present, 
the most likely scenario is continued political 
paralysis in the UK leading to a demand for a 
further extension of Article 50 in October. Other 
possibilities, not mutually exclusive, include: 
q  the election of a new Conservative prime minister after 
the more or less voluntary retirement of Mrs May;
q  a surprise agreement between the Conservative 
and Labour leadership on a renegotiated Political 
Declaration in a soft Brexit direction;
q  a clear preference indicated by the House of 
Commons for a softer Brexit, mandating the 
government;
q  another general election leading to a majority  
or a coalition government;
q  a second referendum decisively in favour of Brexit  
or not – as the case may be. 
The most likely scenario is continued 
political paralysis in the UK leading  
to a demand for a further extension of 
Article 50 in October.
Although he does not speak on behalf of a unified 
European Council, Mr Tusk boldly proposes that 
the UK should rescind Article 50 after holding a 
referendum. Other EU leaders are more reticent 
with their advice, waiting impatiently for the UK to 
expedite its decision to quit.  
 
More prevarication means extra costs  
and investor uncertainty.
Guy Verhofstadt, the Liberal leader in the Parliament 
and Brexit coordinator, laments the loss of unity 
among the EU 27 and between the EU institutions. 
For him, the six-month extension imposed by the 
European Council releases the pressure on the British 
to reach an agreement but is too short a time to allow 
for a genuine reorientation of Britain’s European 
policy. Verhofstadt fears that toxic British politics will 
poison the new Parliament and Commission. 
There are many, not least in business, who agree 
with Verhofstadt about the risk of further delay. 
Many businesses have already spent a lot of money 
in making contingency arrangements for the UK’s 
leaving the EU on 29 March. More prevarication 
means extra costs and investor uncertainty. 
And business seems to have a better grasp than 
politicians of the fact that extending Article 50  
eats into the valuable transition period – guaranteed 
under the Withdrawal Agreement only until  
31 December 2020.11 
Their decision to allow the British a 
flexible extension has put the heads of 
government in an invidious position.
Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker told 
the Parliament (16 April) that it is “not my working 
hypothesis” that the 31 October deadline will be 
further extended. But it is perfectly possible that the 
European Council on 17-18 October will be faced by 
a fresh demand from the British prime minister for a 
further extension.  
THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL LOSES CONTROL
In truth, their decision to allow the British a flexible 
extension has put the heads of government in an 
invidious position. On the one hand, it is unwise, by 
granting ‘flextension’, for the European Council to 
allow itself to be blamed for trapping the UK inside 
the Union against the expressed will of the British 
people to leave it. 
That it only takes one head of government to veto a 
further extension of Article 50 does not mean that, 
come October, yet more procrastination will not be 
the preferred option.12 Under the duty of unanimity, 
the European Council could tend to take the line of 
least resistance, especially as Presidents Juncker and 
Tusk will be readying to leave office. 
5On the other hand, no single leader, including 
President Macron, wants to stand accused of 
throwing the British out of the Union without a deal. 
Leo Varadkar, the Irish leader, will continue to fight 
against a no deal Brexit. The position of Chancellor 
Merkel remains decisive. The European Council’s 
Brexit rain-check in June is critical: if by then 
nothing has moved in London to break the deadlock, 
the mood of the chiefs will harden, Angela Merkel 
among them.  
The future of the European Union seems 
to be left entirely exposed to the alarming 
caprice of British politics.
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the European 
Council has for the moment lost control of Brexit. 
It will be difficult to retrieve. The future of the 
European Union seems to be left entirely exposed  
to the alarming caprice of British politics. As  
Mr Juncker remarked, while the EU has established 
how Britain should withdraw, it now appears to be 
up to Britain alone to decide when it will do so.  
MEANWHILE AT WESTMINSTER
While the European Council confirmed its absolute 
refusal to reopen the Withdrawal Agreement 
to placate the hard Brexiteers, it repeated its 
willingness to revise the Political Declaration on the 
future relationship with a view to a softer Brexit. In 
effect, the EU is offering the UK a very privileged 
partnership wrapped up in a dynamic association 
agreement designed to foster cooperation, manage 
conflicts and encourage convergence.13 Brussels is 
astonished that the prime minister cannot even 
oblige her own cabinet to rally round this package 
deal under the discipline of collective responsibility.  
The EU is offering the UK a very privileged 
partnership wrapped up in a dynamic 
association agreement designed to 
foster cooperation, manage conflicts and 
encourage convergence.
The EU was encouraged, therefore, when a cross-
party group of MPs, led by the veteran Tory Oliver 
Letwin, managed to seize control of the business of 
the House of Commons for a day or two.14 The time 
was used to mount a series of indicative votes to 
test options. While no option attained a majority 
of the House, the option of no deal was repeatedly 
and roundly defeated – and the arch-Brexiteers were 
confounded. Options for outcomes that implied 
a rewriting of the Political Declaration in the 
direction of a customs union and even single market 
membership did well. This came as no surprise to 
anyone who had been paying attention.15
For example, on 1 April a resolution tabled by Kenneth 
Clarke, the father of the House, was only lost by 273 
votes to 276. It sought to instruct the government to 
“ensure that any Withdrawal Agreement and Political 
Declaration negotiated with the EU must include, as 
a minimum, a commitment to negotiate a permanent 
and comprehensive UK-wide customs union with the 
EU”. It was a pity, then, that after a tied vote on 3 April 
the rebel MPs had to surrender control of the business 
of the House back to the government.  
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL GOES TO BRUSSELS
The EU’s constant reiteration of its invitation to 
improve the Political Declaration has been ignored 
by the prime minister. She has preferred to make 
unilateral British declarations intended to mollify 
the arch-Brexiteers in her own party and in the 
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) of Northern Ireland. 
In this enterprise, largely focussed on the Irish 
backstop, Mrs May has fielded her melodramatic (but 
in EU matters unschooled) Attorney General Geoffrey 
Cox on missions to Brussels.  
The astonishing, if brief, experiment in 
bipartisan politics at Westminster has not 
been wholly in vain.
Mr Cox’s excursions have not been met with 
unalloyed success.16 Indeed, the most recent 
European Council saw fit to warn Mrs May that 
“any unilateral commitment, statement or other act 
should be compatible with the letter and the spirit 
of the Withdrawal Agreement and must not hamper 
its implementation”.  
IMPROVING THE POLITICAL DECLARATION
Nevertheless, the astonishing, if brief, experiment 
in bipartisan politics at Westminster has not been 
wholly in vain. Members of the Labour shadow 
cabinet have been meeting since with certain 
government ministers in pursuit of a compromise.17 
The exercise is supported by Jeremy Corbyn. Theresa 
May’s position is, as ever, harder to read: whatever 
compromise emerges is bound to oblige her to modify 
her previous red lines with regard to a customs union, 
independent trade policy and freedom of movement. 
What is significant, however, is that the fury of the 
Conservative Brexiteers, volubly expressed, has 
not been enough to block the more pro-European 
Conservative ministers from continuing to commune 
with their Labour counterparts. 
6Some of us have argued that the first draft of the 
Political Declaration was too tentative in tone, 
ambiguous in meaning and negative in substance 
to orientate the UK and EU in a fruitful direction. 
Both the form and content of the final association 
agreement needs to be made more explicit. It is 
possible to rewrite the document in a manner that 
explains more clearly the relevance of the Irish 
backstop and its essentially transitional nature.18 The 
EU’s more consensual language offered to the UK in 
December and January can be included in any new 
draft.19 As can the supplementary joint statement 
of March aimed at speeding up proceedings and 
allowing for the provisional application of measures 
intended to transcend the Irish backstop.20  
LABOUR-TORY TALKS
The talks between government and opposition have 
focussed on modifying the Political Declaration with 
the following range of possible objectives:
q  to commit the UK to seek a new UK-wide customs 
accord with the EU that minimises border disruption, 
sustains industrial supply chains and ensures tariff 
and quota free trade in goods;
q  to strengthen dynamic regulatory alignment  
with the EU acquis in labour, consumer and 
environmental policies;
q  to seek wider UK engagement with relevant EU 
agencies, subject to trustworthy regulatory alignment;
q  to clarify the future security partnership. 
Orthodox EU opinion may be aghast  
at some aspects of the British  
negotiating position.
Mr Corbyn wants the UK to have “a say” in future EU 
trade talks and to attain a guarantee of reciprocal 
access to trade deals that is not, for example, 
currently offered by the EU to Turkey.21 The 
Commission may be asked to redress the asymmetry 
built into the EU’s Turkish customs accord when it 
comes to crafting a bespoke deal for Britain. Both 
Mr Corbyn and Mrs May want to conform to the EU’s 
common commercial policy in goods only, leaving 
open the possibility to negotiate international 
treaties on services, such as telecoms, transport, 
finance, investment, the professions, IPR and data. 
In return for concessions on trade in services, the 
UK will have to drop its rigid attitude to the mobility 
of EU workers.22 The prime minister has yet to 
acknowledge this.
The EU will continue to maintain its four principles 
of free movement. It will not tolerate the creation of 
another Switzerland, free-riding on the back of the 
single market without adherence to the disciplines 
of the market place. But it is very much in the EU’s 
interest to reach a sustainable accommodation with 
Britain, its largest strategic neighbour. 
Orthodox EU opinion may be aghast at some aspects 
of the British negotiating position. The Commission 
might well object at offering the UK the same, 
exceptional and rather loose deal that was agreed for 
the Channel Islands in 1972.23 Pragmatic voices will 
need to be heard in Brussels, on the understanding 
that the pull of a customs union type agreement 
with the UK will lead to closer market integration, 
involving British acceptance of EU state-aids, public 
procurement and competition policy. Theresa May’s 
bid for “as frictionless a border as possible” deserves 
more than token respect – especially if seconded by 
Mr Corbyn.24 
Mr Corbyn should aim to ensure that the 
final deal is done before the June meeting 
of the European Council, in time to stop 
British MEPs from taking their seats.
One insider estimates that the Tory-Labour talks 
have about a 30% chance of succeeding in the 
next two or three weeks, although the trickiest 
customs union issue is being left until last. If 
they fail, both sides have agreed in principle to 
support the outcome of more indicative votes by 
MPs, ideally using a preferential system such as a 
single transferable vote (STV). This would clear the 
air and prepare the ground for the passage of the 
Withdrawal Agreement Bill which, under the terms 
of section 13 of the EU Withdrawal Act 2018, must 
be enacted before Brexit day. 
For party advantage, the Labour leader may want to 
delay his agreement to the deal until after votes have 
been cast in the European elections. But Mr Corbyn 
should aim to ensure that the final deal is done before 
the June meeting of the European Council, in time to 
stop British MEPs from taking their seats.  
A NEW PRIME MINISTER
Theresa May has already announced that she will 
resign shortly after delivering Brexit. This raises 
concern in Brussels and Westminster that she could 
be succeeded, as a senior EU official tells me, by 
“someone worse”. One way of constraining the next 
prime minister (and of corralling the EU 27) is to 
upgrade the legal status of the Political Declaration. 
Giving it greater clout would involve confirming its 
function as the draft mandate for the negotiation of 
the final association agreement, thereby rendering it 
soft law and politically binding. Kenneth Armstrong 
has made an elegant proposal for a new legally 
7binding protocol that could be attached to the 
Withdrawal Agreement to act as a legal bridge to the 
Political Declaration.25
An alternative approach to upgrading the Political 
Declaration would be to downgrade it, or, more 
accurately, to detach it from the Withdrawal 
Agreement altogether. In this case, the Commons 
would only be asked to approve the legal treaty 
that extricates the UK from its obligations to the 
EU and to leave until later the matter of the final 
relationship. This manoeuvre could be achieved by 
amending the Withdrawal Agreement Bill. Revising 
the Declaration would then become the top priority 
of the transition period. 
The EU would have no objection to this course 
of action if it facilitated the ratification of the 
Withdrawal Agreement, although the Declaration 
would then risk depredations at the hands of the 
“someone worse” prime minister. And some MPs at 
Westminster would legitimately grumble at being 
asked to take the plunge at a blind Brexit. 
THE REFERENDUM QUESTION
One cannot safely predict the outcome of all these 
efforts to free Brexit from its current impasse. One is 
scarcely on safer ground with respect to the political 
process which will conclude the saga.  
Confusion of outcome and process greatly 
reduces the chance the Commons can 
reach a majority in favour of anything.
There are many Remainers in Britain, somewhat 
encouraged by the blandishments of Tony Blair 
and Donald Tusk, who believe without fear of 
contradiction that a second referendum would be 
bound to lead to the immediate revocation of  
Article 50. Opinion polls are much more  
nuanced, however.26
During the indicative votes in the Commons, a 
motion was supported by 280 MPs which would “not 
allow” the ratification of the Withdrawal Agreement 
and Political Declaration “unless and until they have 
been approved by the people of the United Kingdom 
in a confirmatory public vote”.27 Such confusion of 
outcome and process greatly reduces the chance 
the Commons can reach a majority in favour of 
anything. The confused aside, there are many MPs 
who want a deal but no referendum, and many 
others who want a referendum but no deal. 
Moreover, there are important technical as well 
as political and constitutional arguments against 
pursuing another referendum. On the technical 
level, there is simply not enough time before  
31 October for parliament, first, to approve 
and ratify the Withdrawal Agreement (with its 
implementation suspended pending a public 
vote), and then, second, to enact new legislation 
to organise the referendum, with adequate time 
allowed for the fighting of the referendum campaign. 
Deciding to hold a confirmatory referendum, 
therefore, would mean the UK asking the EU for a 
further, longer extension. 
The UK Electoral Commission would insist that the 
conduct of the referendum was both free and fair. 
The Commons would need to agree on a binary 
question that did not effectively disenfranchise that 
large part of the electorate opposing not only the 
EU’s deal on offer but also the revocation of Brexit. 
Parliament could overrule the Electoral Commission, 
but not without litigation and public outcry.  
THE REFERENDUM ANSWER
On a political level, the majority of MPs from all 
parties (except the SNP) are acutely sensitive to the 
fact that they promoted the 2016 referendum in the 
first place, pledged solemnly to respect its outcome 
and then, accordingly, voted to trigger Article 50. 
One can be sure that another referendum promoted 
specifically to overturn the result of the first would 
deepen the divisions in the nation in terms of social 
class, generation and province. Those who claim 
that a ‘people’s vote’ would magically heal the rift 
across the country and settle the issue of Britain’s 
European policy once and for all are likely to be 
proved badly wrong. Brussels knows that unless 
the result of a second referendum were a massive 
majority on a high turnout for revocation, nothing 
very much would be settled at all. 
Different results in the four nations of the United 
Kingdom, as we had in 2016, would quicken the 
debate about the breakup of the Kingdom, provoking 
a return to violence in Northern Ireland. While no 
political party would emerge unscathed by internal 
divisions during the referendum campaign, the 
Conservative and Labour parties would be shattered.  
It would seem to be folly of the highest 
order, having made the big mistake  
of holding one referendum, to compound 
the error by holding another.
Indeed, is it realistic to imagine that the Conservative 
and Labour parties, having just ratified the Withdrawal 
Agreement in Parliament, would then go out to the 
country campaigning to reject it? And what would 
be the impact on the British system of parliamentary 
government were the people to pitch themselves 
directly against a deal just done by parliament? 
8It would seem to be folly of the highest order, having 
made the big mistake of holding one referendum, to 
compound the error by holding another.
The concept of a ‘confirmatory referendum’ has 
superficial appeal, especially to MPs lacking the 
self-confidence to take the decision about Brexit 
on their own account. But having to resort to a 
referendum because parliament is weak is liable only 
to enfeeble further that parliament. A referendum 
which is merely opportunistic would transfer on to 
the shoulders of the British public that very same 
complex dilemma with which MPs themselves are 
unable to cope. Militants and extremists on either 
side of the Brexit argument would relish doing 
battle: the rest may watch in dismay as the country 
spirals out of control.  
TAKING BACK CONTROL
Britain’s national crisis is grave and worsening. 
Brexit by accident without a deal remains a real 
possibility. The Good Friday Agreement is in 
jeopardy. The electorate is deeply polarised. The 
government has no majority in parliament and the 
prime minister has lost control of her cabinet and 
party. The British economy continues to sink. 
The European Union, poised to elect new leadership, 
is being destabilised by Brexit. Anxious to move on 
to tackle some big legislative and diplomatic issues, 
the EU is distracted from doing so. Having dealt 
efficiently with the first phase of Brexit, it now faces 
the possibility of years of wrangling with the British. 
The longer the Brexit crisis prevails the greater the 
cracks in the unity of the 27 member states and in 
the cohesion among the EU institutions. 
Failure to reach an agreement before the summer 
will cause intractable problems on both sides of the 
Channel. An antagonistic, nationalist Britain will 
be an inhospitable place for EU citizens. A hobbled 
European Union may find it impossible to cast off its 
wounded British limb. 
Time and common sense are of the essence. The 
House of Commons has a huge responsibility in 
these circumstances to come together quickly on a 
decent compromise and to park for the moment its 
normal adversarial and opportunistic behaviour. The 
lunge to populism must be reversed.  
Failure to reach an agreement before the 
summer will cause intractable problems on 
both sides of the Channel. An antagonistic, 
nationalist Britain will be an inhospitable 
place for EU citizens. A hobbled European 
Union may find it impossible to cast off its 
wounded British limb.
The elements of compromise on the Political 
Declaration are there. The Withdrawal Agreement 
does the job of extricating the UK from its 
membership of the Union in an orderly manner, 
minimising collateral damage. It provides a decent 
and flexible transition period. It offers the prospect 
of negotiating the best association agreement that 
the EU has ever struck with any third country. 
Having tasted Brexit, in a number of years’  
time, it is quite likely – and would be utterly 
desirable – that the British people will have another 
look at membership of the European Union. One 
could have another referendum at that stage, but  
on triggering Article 49, not on revoking Article 50.28 
And by then Europe, having moved further in the 
federal direction, should be more able to cope with 
its wayward island neighbour.
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